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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
v. 
DARIUS MALAGA, Case No. 20030347-CA 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. INCARCERATED 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
CONCESSIONS 
The State is correct that Mr. Malaga's reasonable doubt jury instruction passes 
muster under State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, 527 Ut. Adv. Rep. 10. 
The State is correct that under State v. Pinder. 2005 UT 15, ^ 62, 114 P.3d 551, 
because trial counsel affirmatively assented to the jury instructions challenged on appeal, 
the invited error doctrine prevents this Court from applying the manifest injustice 
exception to the waiver rule. See id.' 
'The State properly does not dispute that this Court should nonetheless review the 
challenged jury instructions for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The doctrine of 
invited error is designed to stop parties from taking one strategically advantageous 
position at trial, and then reversing that position on appeal in the event that the first 
strategy failed at trial. See, e^, State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989). 
The invited error doctrine does not apply to block plain error analysis when there is no 
conceivable strategic basis for the party's error at trial, or when there is ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See id. Even strategic choices of lawyers are reviewed for 
H. 
THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
REQUIRE A NEW TRIM.. 
A. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY 
The State contends that Malaga was charged alternatively as a principal and as an 
accomplice, and that because the State's theory at trial was that he was liable as a 
principal, the absence of accomplice liability elements in the elements instructions was 
not error, but may be viewed a constructive amendment to the information. State's brief 
at 19-26. 
By reviewing the amended information, the Court can readily confirm that Malaga 
was charged "as a party" in each count, and that the facts alleged in the probable cause 
statement involve accomplice liability (R. 76-79, in the addendum). The probable cause 
statement alleges that Malaga and others assaulted Williams, and that Malaga taped the 
wrists of Williams and put him in the trunk of Williams' car, and that Malaga took Amy 
Tavey from the car after stating that she would "have to do" since Williams could not be 
found, but does not allege that Malaga actually shot Tavey, robbed Williams, or conspired 
to kill Williams. 
At the preliminary hearing, the State did not call Loleni Tuaone (who testified at 
trial that Malaga confessed to shooting Tavey), or present any other evidence that Malaga 
was the shooter (R. 449 at 1-262; R. 450 at 267-364). The magistrate issued a bindover 
ineffective assistance. See Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59. 
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order on all of the amended charges (R. 450 at 363). 
The State's argument that at trial, the State never pursued Malaga as an 
accomplice, e.g.. State's brief at 20, is not accurate. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor largely attributed the conspiracy to murder 
Keith Williams to Olive (R. 459 at 984-990, 1013). The prosecutor attributed the 
aggravated robbery of Keith Williams to "the boys" including Malaga, and to Olive, who 
"set into motion the chain of events that led to the aggravated robbery of Keith Williams." 
(R. 459 at 992, 1010, 1013). The prosecutor attributed the aggravated kidnaping of Keith 
Williams to "the boys" including Malaga (R. 459 at 994-95), and also argued that the 
kidnaping was part the plan which was "orchestrated and communicated" by Olive (R. 
459 at 1013). While the prosecutor contended that Malaga shot Tavey (R. 459 at 1012), 
she also argued that Olive and the group of conspirators killed Tavey (R. 459 at 1011), 
and that the jurors should hold Malaga and Olive liable as parties for Tavey's murder (R. 
459 at 1013). 
This Court can readily understand why the prosecution relied on accomplice 
liability to charge and argue for Malaga's convictions, understand why the court 
instructed the jurors that they could convict Malaga on a theory of accomplice liability, 
and understand why the jury may well have relied on this theory in convicting Malaga. 
The prosecution's case was investigated, built and conveyed at trial with the inconsistent 
statements of young methamphetamine-addicted criminals, all of whom harbored biases 
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of one sort or another, and who made their inconsistent statements in the course of trying 
to curry favor with the police by bringing their allegations into conformity with the 
"nuggets" of information the police told them. See Malaga's opening brief at 3-23. 
Given the poor quality of the State's case, it would be naturally more comfortable to shore 
up any doubts about Malaga's guilt as the principal with the theory that he could be 
convicted because he was, at a minimum, a participant in at least some of the crimes that 
night. See Instruction No. 15. But see, e^ , State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App. 309, ^  54-
55 (to convict on theory of accomplice liability, State must prove that defendant harbored 
mental state required for underlying offense, and solicited, requested, commanded, 
encouraged, or intentionally aided the offense). 
Assuming arguendo that the State is correct that the accomplice liability 
instructions were applied only to Olive by the prosecution's and Olive's counsel's 
arguments, e.g.. State's brief at 21-22, reference to the plain language of the instructions 
demonstrates that the trial judge told the jurors to apply those instructions to both 
defendants, including Malaga. Instructions No. 22 and 15 informed the jurors that they 
could convict "every person" or "the defendant", terms which include Malaga, as an 
accomplice (R. 640, Instr. 22; R. 633, Instr. 15). 
Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor had argued that Malaga was guilty solely 
as a principal on each count, the jurors were instructed to follow the law as stated by the 
court (R. 623, Instr. 5; R. 625, Instr. 7), and to disregard any legal arguments made by the 
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lawyers which varied from the court's instructions (R. 639, Instr. 21). Malaga's jurors are 
presumed to have followed the court's instructions. E.g., State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 
272 (Utah 1998). 
Given the language of the amended information, the State's accomplice liability 
theory at trial, and the trial court's instructions on accomplice liability, this Court should 
reject the State's suggestion that the omission of the accomplice liability elements from 
the elements instructions can be transmogrified into a constructive amendment of the 
information. See State's brief at 22-23. The record of this case distinguishes the State's 
authorities. Compare State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992) (no prejudice 
from error injury instructions which mentioned predicate offenses for aggravated sexual 
assault which differed from the predicate offenses charged in the information, because 
predicate offenses in the jury instructions were included in the statute cited in the 
information, were supported by the evidence, and did not increase the defendant's 
criminal liability); State v. Pederson, 2005 UT App 98, 110 P.3d 164 (defendant charged 
with theft by receiving stolen property was not entitled to jury instructions on mental 
states lower than were involved in the charged offense or any lesser included offense); 
and Harris v. State, 830 So.2d 681, 684 (Miss. App. 2002) (jury instruction in DUI case 
was properly amended to omit requirement that jury find that defendant refused a 
chemical test, because refusal was not an element of offense; indictment was similarly 
properly amended). 
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In the context of this case, it cannot be credibly concluded that had trial counsel 
objected to the elements instructions' omission of the accomplice liability elements, the 
trial court simply would have removed the accomplice liability theory from the amended 
information as mere surplusage. But see State's brief at 22-23. 
Because the jurors were not required to hold the prosecution to its burden of 
proving the elements of accomplice liability by the elements instructions defining the 
offenses of conviction, the convictions must be reversed. See, e.g.. State v. Chaney, 1999 
UT App. 309, fflf 54-55, 989 P.2d 1091 (elements instructions premised on accomplice 
liability must include appropriate mens rea on accomplice liability); State v. Jones, 823 
P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1980) (instruction on basic elements of offense is essential). 
The State's argues that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the 
elements instruction, because the accomplice liability elements were irrelevant to 
Malaga's prosecution, which was premised on the theory that Malaga was the principal. 
State's brief at 24-26. As detailed above, the State charged Malaga as a party and argued 
accordingly at trial, and the trial court's instructions permitted the jurors to convict 
Malaga if they found that he was a mere participant. See Instruction No. 15. But see, 
e.g., Chanev, supra, (to convict on theory of accomplice liability, State must prove that 
defendant harbored mental state required for underlying offense, and solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided the offense). 
Particularly given the questionable nature of the State's case, and the reversible 
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nature of erroneous elements instructions, see Malaga's opening brief at 28 and nn. 8 and 
9, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence of trial 
counsel's failure to object to the absence of the accomplice liability elements in the 
elements instructions.2 Trial counsel's objectively deficient and prejudicial failure to 
object to the erroneous instructions thus requires a new trial. 
B. ERRONEOUS MURDER ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION 
The State posits that because the State did not pursue the originally charged theory 
of depraved indifference murder, the jurors disregarded instruction 42, which stated: 
As used in these instructions, "grave risk of death" refers to the 
probability of the risk of death greater than just a "substantial and 
justifiable" risk. A "grave risk of death" means a highly likely probability 
that death will result from the risk that the defendant knowingly creates. 
(R. 662). 
The jurors were not informed of this law, or told to disregard instruction 42. 
Rather, they were instructed to consider all the instructions "as one connected whole" and 
"as a part of the entire charge and not as though any one sentence or instruction separately 
were intended to state the whole law of the case upon any particular point." (R. 61, Instr. 
2). 
2
 Taking the State's constructive amendment theory to its logical conclusion 
demonstrates that it does not apply with integrity. Particularly given the questionable 
nature of the State's cast of witnesses against Malaga, see Malaga's opening brief at 3-23, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of acquittal had the accomplice liability theory been 
amended out of the information and removed from the jury instructions. 
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Particularly because Instruction 42 followed the elements instruction for murder, 
the jurors may well have thought that Instruction 42 elucidated the theory of murder that 
Malaga, "intending to cause serious bodily injury to another ... committed an act clearly 
dangerous to human life, which act caused the death of Amy Tavey." (R. 661, Instr. 41). 
The instruction does not accurately apply, and appears to have been designed to address 
an element of depraved indifference homicide, but did so erroneously under State v. 
Powell 972 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994). 
Because jurors were instructed to apply all the instructions (R. 61, Instr. 2), and are 
presumed to have followed the court's instructions, e.g.. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 
272 (Utah 1998), this Court should consider this error in assessing the cumulative impact 
of all of the erroneous jury instructions. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 
1993) (court will reverse conviction if cumulative effect of errors undermines the Court's 
confidence in the fairness of the trial). 
C. INSTRUCTION TO TREAT OLIVE'S TESTIMONY AS THAT OF ANY OTHER 
WITNESS 
Cases cited by the State support Malaga's argument that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that Olive should be treated as any other witness, given her 
accomplice status. 
People v. Box, 5 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2000), recognizes that when a co-defendant 
accomplice testifies against the defendant, the trial court should instruct the jurors to view 
the accomplice's testimony with caution to the extent that it incriminates the defendant. 
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M. at 167. 
People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1996), approves of a similar instruction as 
the Box instruction, explaining that while a defendant's testimony should not be 
distrusted merely because he is a defendant, it is not entitled to be viewed without distrust 
merely by virtue of the fact that the witness stands charged. Id. at 404 and n.23. Alvarez 
properly recognizes that jurors should be instructed to view a charged co-defendant 
accomplices's testimony with caution, because the co-defendant has the means, motive 
and opportunity to exculpate himself by incriminating the defendant. Id. 
In the instant matter, jury instruction 10 twice instructed the jurors to treat the 
testimony of Olive as that of any other witness. This insulated her testimony from the 
accomplice testimony warning instruction, and effectively told the jury that her testimony 
was entitled not to be viewed with distrust, as it should have been. See Alvarez, supra. 
The fact that the jurors believed Olive's testimony, see Malaga's opening brief at 
22-23, 34-35, despite its contradiction of the vast majority of the State's evidence, 
see Malaga's opening brief at 3-23, demonstrates the prejudicial impact of Instruction 10, 
which this Court should account for in its cumulative error analysis. See Dunn, supra. 
D. PROXIMATE CAUSE INSTRUCTION 
The record contradicts the State's claim that counsel for Malaga did not argue 
intervening cause, see State's brief at 36-40. He conceded that Malaga had committed 
wrongful acts, but argued that the jurors should not convict him of the ultimate offenses 
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in the absence of proof that he was the actual person who committed those ultimate 
offenses (t^ R. 459 at 1042, 1061, 1065). Trial counsel argued that he did not think the 
jurors would know beyond a reasonable doubt "who did what exactly to Keith Williams, 
... or who killed Amy Tavey." (R. 454 at 127). See also R. 454 at 129-132; R. 459 at 
1044 (same). He argued that the State's witnesses who fabricated the motive that Malaga 
killed Tavey as a "tax job" related to Liz Spresser, would otherwise be charged for her 
murder (R. 459 at 1044). He argued that the "white car crew" (Olive, Anthony Lavulo, 
Marguerite Lao and Amanda Miller) were responsible, and fabricated the claim that 
Malaga came and took Tavey from their car (R. 459 at 1049, 1052, 1063-64). He 
suggested that Tony Pita was the actual shooter (R. 459 at 1064). All of these arguments 
constitute intervening cause arguments, particularly given counsel's concession that 
Malaga was involved in illegal activities related to the crimes charged, but should not be 
convicted of the ultimate offenses absent sufficient proof (R. 459 at 1042, 1061, 1065). 
Malaga does not contend that the court should have given the same instruction as 
the court gave in State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984), a negligent homicide case. 
Compare State's brief at 39-40 with Malaga's opening brief at 37-38. Rather, he 
contends that the trial court should have instructed the jurors on the concept addressed in 
Lawson's instruction and explained in LaFave - that reasonably unforeseeable acts of 
third parties constitute intervening causes which break the chain of causation between the 
defendant's actions and the crime. See Malaga's opening brief at 36-38. 
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The instruction the court gave permitted the jurors to convict if they believed that 
Malaga's act or omission caused her death, or set in operation the factors that 
accomplished her death (R. 663; R. 43). While the instruction indicates that an "efficient 
intervening cause" could break the causal chain, it does not inform the jurors of what an 
efficient intervening cause is, or inform them that Malaga could not be held liable for the 
unforeseeable actions of third parties. See id. 
Particularly when the causation instruction is viewed in conjunction with the 
accomplice liability instruction 15, which permitted conviction for unspecified 
participation, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had the jurors been 
instructed correctly, and the Court should assess the cumulative impact of all the 
erroneous instructions. See Dunn, supra. 
E. FLIGHT INSTRUCTION 
The State argues that trial counsel may have made a valid strategic choice to 
abstain from objecting to the flight instruction, which erroneous omitted the two concepts 
required by State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983), that Malaga's flight might 
have been prompted by reasons fully consistent with innocence, and that although his 
flight might reflect consciousness of guilt, it did not necessarily reflect actual guilt, see id. 
State's brief at 41-43. The State posits that perhaps trial counsel abstained from objecting 
to the absence of the Bales consideration, because he had no evidentiary basis for seeking 
jury instructions which comport with the controlling law. State's brief at 41-43. 
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As the State tacitly acknowledges later in its argument, despite acknowledging that 
Malaga should not have assaulted Williams and been involved in abandoning his car (R. 
459 at 1061), had the jury been properly instructed, trial counsel might have argued that 
Malaga's flight was fully consistent with his innocence of the crimes charged, and that 
although his flight might reflect his guilty conscience, it did not necessarily establish his 
guilt of any of the charged offenses. Cf. State's brief at 44. Thus, the evidence was 
consistent with Bales, and there could have been no strategic reason to refrain from 
seeking a flight instruction as favorable to Malaga as the law requires. 
The State argues that any error was harmless, but its summary of the evidence fails 
to acknowledge the patent weaknesses in the State's case. The State's reliance on Kelli 
Kershaw's testimony does not go far, for Kershaw was the once girlfriend of Lolene 
Tuaone, and could only testify as to Malaga's participation in abandoning Williams' car -
something for which he was not charged (R. 456 at 564-571). Lolene Tuaone, who 
claimed that Malaga confessed, made inconsistent statements and was severely biased, 
because he was Olive's cousin, and was in serious criminal jeopardy at the time that he 
gave his probation officer and the police his contribution to their case. See Malaga's 
opening brief at 17 n.4. The Las Vegas police officer who provided Malaga's supposed 
confession to assaulting Keith Williams, did not record this supposed confession, did not 
write a report, and threw away his notes (R. 456 at 644, 647). The other witnesses against 
Malaga were young methamphetamine addicted criminals who were trying to limit their 
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own criminal liability by providing the police with allegations of which the police 
essentially informed them. See Malaga's opening brief at 3-23. On this record, 
particularly when the effects of the errors are assessed cumulatively, this Court should 
grant Malaga a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted on November 4, 2005. 
ElizVbetnnunH^ 
AttorneVfor Mr. Malaga 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to: 
Assistant Attorney General Karen Klucznik, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84105, on November 3, 2005. 
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AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 021906485FS 
The undersigned Detective J. Prior - Salt Lake City Police Department, Agency Case No. 
02-76458, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes 
of: 
COUNT I 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First Degree Felony, at approximately 1595 South 
Riverside Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about May 4, 2002, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendant, DARIUS PENI MALAGA, a party to the offense, intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Amy Tavey; and/or intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to Amy Tav^y, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the 
death of Amy Tavey; and/or acting under circumstances evidencing depraved 
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
Amy Tavey, and thereby caused the death of Amy Tavey. Further, that a dangerous 
weapon or a facsimile of a dangerous weapon or the representation of a dangerous 
weapon was used iik the commission or furtherance of the Criminal Homicide, giving rise 
to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
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COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 1768 West 1300 North, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May 4, 2002, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, DARIUS 
PENI MALAGA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Keith Williams, seize Keith Williams with the 
intent to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize him or another. Further, that a dangerous 
weapon or a facsimile of a dangerous weapon or the representation of a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Kidnapping, giving 
rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
NOTICE IS GIVEN pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1, that the defendant is subject 
to an enhanced pdnalty as provided in that section because the above offense was 
committed in concert with two or more persons. 
COUNT III 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 1768 West 1300 North, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May 4, 2002, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, DARIUS 
PENI MALAGA, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
property in the possession of Keith Williams from the person or immediate presence of 
Keith Williams, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use 
of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Keith 
Williams. Further, that a dangerous weapon or a facsimile of a dangerous weapon or ihe 
representation of a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
NOTICE IS GIVEN pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1, that the defendant is subject 
to an enhanced penalty as provided in that section because the above offense was 
committed in concert with two or more persons. 
COUNT IV 
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a Second Degree Felony, 
at 1768 West 1300lNorth, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about May 4, 2002, 
in violation of Title! 76, Chapter/, Section 20l, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, DARIUS PENI MALAGA, a party to the offense, conspired to 
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Keith Williams. 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
DAONo. 02008690 
Page 3 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
D. Caruso, J. Prior, C. Parks, J. Snow, M. Scharman, C. Gilbert, D. Jensen, N. Swensen, 
Keith Williams, Ed Leis and Marguerite Manatau 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant, a detective with the Salt Lake City Police Department, bases probable cause 
upon the reports in case number 2002-76408, 2002-76458, and the following: 
1. The statement of Keith D. Williams that on or about May 4, 2002, he responded 
to 1768 West 1300 North, Apartment 24, in Salt Lake County, having been invited there by a 
A.M., a female juvenile. Apiy Tavey accompanied Keith Williams to the apartment. 
2. The statement of Silia Olive that she had instructed A.M. to telephone Keith 
Williams and invite him over to the apartment. The further statement of Olive that defendant 
Darius Malaga had made statements to her about getting even with Williams by "kicking his 
ass," to retaliate for something which Malaga believed Williams had done. 
3. The statement of Williams that when he arrived at Apartment 24, the door was 
locked and that he and Tavey knocked on the door. The door was opened by Olive, who invited 
the two into the apartment. As she was opening the door, Williams noticed that Olive glanced to 
her left, behind the door. As he stepped into the apartment, Williams was struck over the head 
with what he described as a silver handgun. Olive indicated to police in a post-Miranda 
statement that it was defendant Malaga who had struck Williams. 
4. The further statement of Williams that as he lay on the floor of the apartment, five 
to six individuals, including but not limited to defendant Malaga and Anthony Lavulo, beat and 
kicked him. At some point during the beating, one of the attackers removed Williams's wallet 
from his pocket, and took a ring and a watch that he was wearing. 
5. After he was beaten and robbed, Williams reports that he was led at gunpoint to 
his own vehicle, where he was bound him with duct tape. Williams was told that he was going 
to be killed and left in the trunk of the car. Olive and Lavulo indicated in their post-Miranda 
statements that it was defejidant Malaga who had taped up Williams. Olive and Lavulo further 
indicated that defendant Malaga then took Williams to his own car, where he placed Williams in 
the trunk. Meanwhile, Olive and Lavulo report that they told Tavey that they would "give her a 
ride home" and took her to another car, where they all got in. 
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6. The statement of Olive and Lavulo that they then followed defendant Malaga's 
car at some distance, evetitually stopping on Riverside Drive near 1570 South. They saw 
defendant Malaga drive further up the road, make a U-turn and then park Williams's car near the 
river. Defendant Malaga then got out of the car, and then approached the car in which Olive and 
Lavulo were traveling with Amy Tavey. Defendant Malaga was yelling, "Where is Keith?" 
When they told him they did not know, defendant Malaga removed Amy Tavey from the vehicle 
stating "if I can't find Keith, she'll have to do." Defendant Malaga then walked into the distance 
with Amy Tavey. 
7. Olive and Lavulo, and an independent witness who lives nearby, reported hearing 
four gunshots. Olive and Lavulo then fled the scene. 
8. Amy Tavey?s body was located in the river approximately 150 yards from the 
spot where defendant Malaga's car was last seen. She had died from multiple gunshot wounds to 
the chest and leg. During a search of the scene, officers located four .380 caliber shell casings 
and three live .380 rounds. 
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